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NOTE
IMPEACHMENT BY UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE: THE RULE OF HARRIS
V. NEW YORK
I. INTRODUCTION
Any criminal justice system can appropriately be described as a
kaleidescope of confrontations between individual and society. The rules
governing the confrontation reflect two conflicting policies: the
protection of the individual and the protection of society. That conflict
was the focus of the recent Supreme Court decision, Harris v. New
York.' Protection of the individual by exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the criminal defendant's constitutional rights was weighed in
the balance with the societal interest in maintaining the purity of the
truth-testing processes of the adversary system. The Court admitted
voluntarily given but unconstitutionally obtained statements to impeach
the defendant's witness stand testimony. This result marks a retreat
from the trend set by the Court in the last decade. The significance of
this decision cannot be fully evaluated so soon after the event, but the
policy considerations which will determine the future impact of Harris
deserve examination. This note will examine the policies behind the
conflicting rules, the case treatment of the specific issue in Harris, and an
analysis of the case and the problems it leaves unresolved.
II. THE POLICIES AND PURPOSES
a. The Exclusionary Rule
Relevant and probative evidence was first declared inadmissible
because of the manner in which it was obtained in Weeks v. United
States.2 The Court ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment must be excluded to make the Constitution meaningful to
the ii~dividual. This objective would be fulfilled by deterring law
enforcement officers from engaging in proscribed conduct as a means of
1. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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gathering evidence. 3 While the deterrence theory has been the most
prominent basis for the exclusionary rule, other considerations
supporting the doctrine have received considerable attention. For
example, it has been said that the admission of unlawfully obtained
evidence would undermine the integrity of the judicial process and create
disrespect for law.4 It has been maintained that the exclusion of such
tainted evidence does no more than place the prosecution in the position
it would have been in had its agents respected the constitutional rights of
the defendant. 5
Whatever justification for exclusion is used, the primary objective is
clearly to deter unlawful police conduct.' It is equally clear "that civil
and criminal remedies against the offending officer are as a practical
matter ineffective, and hence the rule of exclusion is the only available
remedy to protect society from the excesses which led to the
constitutional right."' 7
3. Id. at 394. Mr. Justice Day said: "To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended
for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action."
4. "It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the
administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination," Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting). See also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 224 n. 10 (1968). See also Brennan, The
Criminal Prosecution:Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279.
6. See analysis by Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of
Narc., - U.S. - - (1971) (dissenting opinion). See notes 21-24 infra and accompanying
text. There is one notable inconsistency in the operation of the exclusionary rules between policy and
practice. None of the policy considerations enunciated in support of exclusion, with the single
exception of making the language of the Constitution meaningful to the defendant, are directly
related to a specific defendant. Yet, the only individual with standing to suppress such evidence is the
person whose rights have been violated. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). It is
reasonable to ask whether deterrence would not be more effective; whether judicial integrity would
not be equally maintained; whether the "contest" would not be fairer if any defendant could
suppress any unconstitutionally obtained evidence sought to be used against him. See Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 n. 12 (1968); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search and
Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488. See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2175 (McNaughton rev.
1961), wherein Wigmore divides rules of "extrinsic policy" into two groups: absolute and optional.
Evidence excluded because unlawfully obtained comes within the absolute group and the rules of
privilege make up the optional class. But see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 139 at 294 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK], who would class the right to object to evidence obtained in
violation of a constitutional right as a privilege. If the statements involved in Harris had been
"privileged", they would be inadmissible for impeachment unless the defendant waived the
privilege. Exclusion is treated as a privilege on the issue of standing but not in determining
admissibility to impeach.
7. Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 512, 141 A.2d 46, 49 (Weintraub, C.J.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 843 (1958).
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The Weeks doctrine was refined," although it was not deemed to be
required by the Constitution until 1961, when Mapp v. Ohio9 specifically
overruled Wolf v. Colorado.0 Wolf had held the fourth amendment
applicable to the states but found the exclusionary rule only an optional
enforcement procedure. Mapp eliminated the optional nature of the rule,
stating: "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly that its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of
its own existence.""'
Miranda v. Arizona" adopted an exclusionary rule for evidence
obtained in violation of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. While the policy considerations behind Miranda appear
to be the same as those considerations in Brain v. United States,13 it is
clear that Brain lacked the specificity necessary to stand as precedent for
a rule of absolute exclusion. In that case, decided prior to Weeks, the
Court ruled that the admissibility of confessions was controlled by the
fifth amendment; but Brain was severely weakened by its inaccurate
analysis of the history of both the confession doctrine and the privilege
against self-incrimination." Miranda, while incorporating the
arguments from Bram, left no doubt what police and prosecutors must
8. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States. 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (e), Advisory Committee Notes.
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
II. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
14. Brain is a curious case. Some of the language used would appear to have made Miranda
unnecessary and repetitious:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises whether a
confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the
5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States commanding that no person "shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
168 U.S. at 542. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, extensively analyzed the history of the
confession rule and the development of the privilege against self-incrimination, concluding:
A brief consideration of the reasons which gave rise to the adoption of the 5th Amendment,
of the wrongs which it was intended to prevent, and of the safeguards which it was its purpose
unalterably to secure, will make it clear that the generic language of the amendment was but
a crystalization of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled when the amendment was
adopted ....
Id. Even scholars sympathetic to the objectives of Brain conceded the inaccuracy of this statement.
See, e.g., Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1949). See
also MCCORMICK § 75(b) at 155 ("historical blunder); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823 at 250 n.5
(3rd ed. 1940) ("no assertions could be more unfounded.") Thus, the significance of the case is
extremely difficult to evaluate. The objectives of Brain were approved by the Court in Miranda and
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do to protect the individual's fifth amendment rights. 5 The primary
objective of Miranda was to make the protection of the fifth amendment
meaningful to the individual by invoking what the Court considered the
only effective deterrent available: exclusion."6
The Weeks exclusionary rule has been the subject of controversy since
its inception, 7 and its fifth amendment counterpart has received similar
criticism. Although Congress adopted the Weeks doctrine when the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated,"8 it refused to
accept the Miranda holding. Section 3501 of Title 18, U.S.C. was a clear
attempt to limit the absolute exclusion required by Miranda and was in
direct conflict with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution." This
legislation has yet to be ruled on by the Court, but there are signs
favoring the drafters' prognostication that "by the time the issue of
it is arguable that the Weeks doctrine was established to provide consistency between the fourth
amendment and a misconceived exclusionary rule, established by Bram, under the fifth amendment.
Compare the Court's treatment of Bram in Weeks with its discussion of Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886) in Brain. Meaningful analysis of the interrelationship of these three cases would be
an interesting study, but would be purely academic after Miranda.
Even if one of the objectives of Weeks was to create consistency between the two amendments, a
reverse application of this effort has never been fully achieved even though the attempt has been
made. See notes 30-36 infra and accompanying text. But see Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts 12(c), 41 (e)&(0,
48 F.R.D. 547, 580, 627-28 (1970). For an excellent example of the type of problems involved in
creating procedural consistency between the two constitutional provisions, see the opinions of
Judges Jerome Frank, Learned Hand and Augustus Hand in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (1947); Note
The Pre-Indictiment Suppression of Illegally Obtained Confessions, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 73.
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966):
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
16. Id.
17. Wigmore was vehement in his criticism: "[T]he heretical influence of Weeks v. United States
spread, and evoked a contagion of sentimentality in some of the State Courts, inducing them to
break loose from long-settled fundamentals." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940). The
most frequently quoted line criticizing the rule was provided by Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y.Ct. App. 1926); "The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered." It is this simple logic that is at the core of the critics' attack. See Chief
Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. of
Narc., 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2012 (1971), discussed infra. See also Burns, Mapp v. Ohio:An AlI-Atnerican
Mistake, 19 DEPADL L. REV. 80 (1969); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (b) (1969) (emphasis added):
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (I) the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/4
Vol. 1971:441] IMPEACHMENT
constitutionality would reach the Supreme Court, the probability. . . is
that this legislation would be upheld."0
Chief Justice Warren Burger, who wrote the majority opinion in
Harris, later voiced strong objections to the exclusionary rule in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.2'
His objections are based on traditional criticisms: (1) perfectly reliable
and probative evidence establishing guilt cannot be used because
someone else broke the law; (2) the officer who violates the law is not
punished; (3) the innocent person whose constitutional rights have been
violated has no remedy; and (4) there is no empirical evidence to show
that the rule in fact deters proscribed conduct.22 Chief Justice Burger
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the
confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required
to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession.
20. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADM. NEWS, S. REP. No. 1097, at 2112,2138,90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was adopted to abrogate the effect of Mallory and Miranda. The
committee report said: "These decisions have resulted in the release of criminals whose guilt is
virtually beyond question. This has had a demoralizing effect on law-enforcement officials whose
efforts to investigate crimes and interrogate suspects have been stymied by the technical roadblocks
thrown up by the Court. The general public is becoming frightened and angered by the many reports
of depraved criminals being released to roam the streets in search of other victims." Id. at 2127. The
report discussed the constitutional issues and concluded:
The committee feels that it is obvious from the opinion of Justice Harlan and other
dissenting Justices . . . that the overwhelming weight of judicial opinion in this country is
that the voluntariness test does not offend the Constitution or deprive a defendant of any
constitutional right. No one can predict with any assurance what the Supreme Court might
at some future day decide if these provisions are enacted. The committee has concluded that
this approach to the balancing of the rights of society and the rights of the individual served
us well over the years, that it is constitutional and that Congress should adopt it. After all,
the Miranda decision itself was by a bare majority of one, and with increasing frequency the
Supreme Court has reversed itself. The committee feels that by the time the issue of
constitutionality would reach the Supreme Court, the probability rather is that this
legislation would be upheld.
Id. at 2138. Another portion of the bill overruled United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The
minority report strongly attacked these provisions: "The provisions on police interrogation and
eyewitness testimony are so squarely in conflict with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in
the Miranda and Wade cases that they will almost certainly be declared unconstitutional as soon as
they are tested in the courts." Id. at 2209. To date, courts considering 18 U.S.C. § 3501 have
ignored the constitutional question. See, e.g., Reinke v. United States, 405 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1968).
21. 91 S. Ct. 1999, 2012 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
22. Id. at 2013-15.
Washington University Open Scholarship
446 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1971:441
adds: "The doctrine deprives the police in no real sense . .. "; it is the
prosecutor, who has no direct control over the police, who is penalized
by losing the conviction.23 The Chief Justice expressed a reluctance to
overrule Weeks and Mapp without first providing a substitute remedy,
and he made specific recommendations to the Congress on that subject. 4
His proposals require greater analysis than can be given here, but his
attitude may reflect the retreat from Miranda anticipated by the drafters
of 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
b. "Voluntariness"
The common law development of the voluntariness standard for
confessions may explain why Weeks and Miranda were separated by
fifty-one years. The traditional basis for the exclusion of confessions was
that "under certain conditions, [they were] testimonially
untrustworthy." The test to determine trustworthiness developed into
the "voluntariness" test. As it evolved, the emphasis was placed more on
the "conditions" under which the statements were obtained and less on
their reliability. 2 The objective of the trustworthiness doctrine was to
protect the fact-finder from hearing unreliable evidence, but as the
emphasis shifted, so did the objective, and the protection of the accused
became a viable objective behind the voluntariness test.27 The
23. Id. at 2015.
24. A simple structure would suffice. For example, Congress could enact a statute along the
following lines:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement officials
committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person aggrieved
by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment or statutes
regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps patterned after the
United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under the statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of evidence
secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be excluded
from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 2018 (footnote omitted).
25. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter
cited as 3 WIGMORE].
26. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GuILT (1959); 3 WIGMORE §§ 822, 826; McCormick, The Scope
of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEX. L. REV. 447 (1938); McCormick, Some Problems and
Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEx. L. REV. 239 (1946).
27. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941):
Our duty then is to determine whether the . ..admission of the confessions [was] so
fundamentally unfair, so contrary to the common concept of ordered liberty as to amount to
a taking of life without due process of law.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/4
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voluntariness of a confession was determined solely by common law
rules which could be established by each state until the Supreme Court
found minimum due process requirements applicable in Brown v.
Mississippi. 28 The cases following Brown further refined the rule and
stated the objective of voluntariness was to secure due process of law.21
It is arguable that Miranda v. Arizona was intended to redefine the
constitutional standard for voluntariness and fuse the rules applicable to
confessions with the privilege against self-incrimination. Some courts
have attempted to apply Miranda in this manner,'3 but that application
is tenuous because of former Chief Justice Warren's treatment of
Miranda in Johnson v. New Jersey3 ' and Davis v. North Carolina.3 2 In
Johnson, the Court held that Miranda was not to be applied
retroactively because the constitutional impact was not as compelling as
it was in other instances,33 and because the burden placed upon the
administration of criminal justice would be overwhelming.34 In Davis, a
confession was excluded on the basis of the pre-Miranda voluntariness
test; the Miranda requirements, however, were expressly included in that
test.3 Thus Miranda has been interpreted to provide a separate test,
leaving unaltered the common law view that "It]he basic standard
governing the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession is whether,
considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement was
voluntary."''3
28. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
29. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S 227 (1940).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Voluntariness is scarcely a
limiting term of art which excludes self-incrimination or violation of the Miranda rules."); State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 243, 422 P.2d 581, 582 (1967). A similar conclusion was drawn in
Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935, 969-84 (1966), which was written
immediately prior to the Miranda decision. An analysis of the circumstances in which the Miranda
requirements are met, but the statements are nevertheless deemed involuntary under the pre-
Miranda test, makes this deduction more apparent. Cf. Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old " Voluntariness" Test, 65
MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966).
31. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
32. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
33. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
See also Haddad, "'Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of the Linkletter
Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969).
34. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966).
35. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966).
36. Murphy v. State, 8 Md. App. 430,435, 260 A.2d 357, 359 (1970). See also State v. Butler, 19
Ohio St. 2d 55, 61, 249 N.E.2d 818, 822 (1969) ("The decision in Miranda did not discard the
IMPEACHMENT
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c. Impeachment
When compared to those of the exclusionary rule and the
voluntariness test, the objectives of testimonial impeachment are
relatively simple. As with most rules of evidence, the objective of the
impeachment process is to facilitate the search for truth.3 7 The objective
of impeachment is clearly distinguishable from the Weeks exclusionary
rule, which serves to exclude unquestionably trustworthy evidence. The
voluntariness test, both pre- and post-Miranda, falls somewhere between
these two extremes because the untrustworthiness of a confession can
stand alone as a reason for exclusion. 3 The predominant reasons for
exclusion under Miranda are very similar to those of Weeks;
nevertheless, the Miranda Court stated that adhering to its requirements
"can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness". 3 1
The exclusionary rules of Weeks and Miranda, as well as the result
imposed when the voluntariness test is not met, raise pre-trial questions
of admissibility, while evidence admitted to impeach goes to the weight
of the testimony. Evidence suppressed because its procurement was
accomplished through constitutionally proscribed means either speaks
directly to the guilt of the accused or is irrelevant. It can be assumed that
evidence subject to suppression would not generally be beneficial to the
defendant if admitted. 40 Impeaching evidence, on the other hand, is
usually related to veracity, character or other factors which have no
direct bearing on the guilt of the accused. In Harris v. New York,
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, which was directly related to guilt
but inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, was admitted to
impeach the accused as a witness. The conflict thus created, between the
impeachment process and the constitutional mandate to protect the
accused, is the focus of this note.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
a. From Agnello to Walder
Agnello v. United States4 was the first Supreme Court case to
distinction between voluntary and involuntary statements made by an accused and used by the
prosecution."). For an example of another situation in which the distinction between the Miranda
test and the traditional voluntariness test has been applied, see In re Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382,
463 P.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. Cal.), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
37. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § I (3rd ed. 1940).
38. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,455-56 n. 24 (1966); 3 WIGMORE § 822.
39. 384 U.S. at 470.
40. "If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the
prosecution." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,477 (1966).
41. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
[Vol. 1971:441
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consider the impeachment issue under the Weeks doctrine. In Agnello,
police seized a can of cocaine in the defendant's home during an
unlawful search made subsequent to the defendant's arrest at another
place on a charge of illegal possession and sale of cocaine. No effort was
made to introduce this evidence in the case in chief, but on cross-
examination the defendant was asked if he had ever seen or had
possession of the can of cocaine. When he responded in the negative, the
can of cocaine was introduced to impeach the defendant. The Supreme
Court held that the illegally obtained evidence could not be admitted and
stated: "the contention that the evidence of the search and seizure was
admissible in rebuttal is without merit. ' 42 Once the determination was
made that the search and seizure was unlawful, the evidence thus seized
would not be admitted for any purpose . 3 This conclusion was in effect
an application of the fundamental rule set forth by Mr. Justice Holmes
in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the court, but that it shall not be used at all. 4
The impeachment problem was apparently settled by Agnello and did
not appear again until 1954 in Walder v. United States.45 Walder had
been arrested in 1950 for illegal possession of narcotics. Police had
illegally seized heroin in Walder's possession and, when the evidence was
suppressed, the charge was dropped. Two years later, Walder was
arrested on a similar charge and the two year old evidence was admitted
at trial to impeach the defendant's direct testimony that he had never
possessed narcotics. The Supreme Court held that the unlawfully
obtained evidence was admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility.
Ruling that a contrary result would provide the defendant "with a shield
against contradiction of his untruths" and thereby create "a perversion
of the Fourth Amendment"," the Court specifically distinguished
42. Id. at 35.
43. This was the primary consideration before the Court because the appellate court had
determined the search to be lawful and never discussed the impeachment question. Agnello v. United
States, 290 Fed. 671 (2d Cir. 1923). The decision was a significant refinement of the Weeks doctrine
in two other respects: (1) the defendant could move to suppress illegally obtained evidence during the
trial if he was not aware that the evidence had been seized; and (2) the subject matter of suppression
was contraband, in which no property right existed. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), Advisory
Committee Notes.
44. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
45. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
46. Id. at 65.
IMPEACHMENT
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Agnello on two important points. The primary emphasis was on the
distinction between direct and cross-examination testimony as the basis
for impeachment. The Court read Agnello as having underscored the
fact that the prosecutor elicited the statements on rebuttal so that he
might "smuggle" the prohibited evidence in,47 while in Walder the
"sweeping claims" were made in response to direct questioning by
defendant's counsel.4" The second distinction was the collateral nature of
the Walder evidence in contrast to the Agnello evidence which was
directly related to defendant's guilt.
The Court said that the defendant "must be free to deny all the
elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the
Government to introduce by way of rebuttal, evidence illegally secured
by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief."4 One difficulty
with Walder was the Court's failure to point out that the evidence would
have been inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief even if legally
obtained because it was not probative or relevant. Nor could it be used
as direct evidence of guilt, as it would have been in Agnello. The Court's
failure in Walder to draw this distinction clearly left a significant
question unanswered: how "collateral" does the unlawfully obtained
evidence have to be? The answer to this question was developed under the
law of confessions, not the law of search and seizure.
b. From Walder to Miranda
The confessions doctrine, even with the expansion of the voluntariness
standard, always required the exclusion of confessions if they were
untrustworthy.50 While courts continued to redefine "voluntariness"
after 1936,'51 the general rule regarding the admissibility of involuntary
confessions to impeach the defendant was:
Involuntary confessions of accused persons are inadmissible to impeach
them as witnesses on the same ground that hearsay and all other
incompetent evidence is inadmissible to impeach other witnesses, because
they are unworthy of belief.5 2
Because of the continued influence of the common law rule that
47. Id. at 66.
48. Id. at 65.
49. Id.
50. See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
51. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
52. State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 249, 354 P.2d 533, 540 (1960). The federal rule was
established in Harrold v. Territory, 169 Fed. 47 (8th Cir. 1909). See also People v. Underwood, 61
[Vol. 1971:441
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confessions were not admissible because they were unreliable, an
involuntary confession was deemed untrustworthy for impeachment
purposes even though its trustworthiness was not the reason it was
judged involuntary. 53 Therefore, Weeks, Agnello and Walder had no
relationship to the confession doctrine. No question concerning the
trustworthiness of evidence suppressed under the auspices of the fourth
amendment was ever raised and no means has been devised to establish
the absolute truth of a confession. However, the exclusionary rule
announced in Mallory v. United States54 applied the deterrence rationale
of Weeks to statements obtained while suspects were in custody in
violation of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 55
The Mallory rule, based on a federal rule and not the Constitution,
was applicable only in the federal courts. The first case to extend Walder
to Mallory confessions was Tate v. United States.56 The sole issue in
Tate was whether the trial court erred in admitting, for impeachment
purposes, the statements by the defendant obtained in violation of
Mallory. Judge Burger,5 7 speaking for the court, characterized the
problem as follows:
[We are faced here] with the problem of reconciling two competing
policies of the law: (1) the policy that proscribes, as a prophylactic
measure, the use of evidence obtained in violation of a rule of law, and (2)
the policy which demands truth from witnesses in the judicial process and
which regards an adversary judicial proceeding as a search for truth. The
rationalization of these competing principles into a consistent pattern is
by no means free from difficulty. . . . The answer lies not in any rigid
formula but rather in a cautious balancing of the important
Cal. 2d 113, 389 P.2d 937, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1964); Ladner v. State, 231 Miss. 445, 95 So. 2d468
(1957); Killough v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 131, 231 P.2d 381 (1951); contra, e.g., State v. McClung,
66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966). See generally 3 WIGMORE
§ 821 at 314-318 n. 9; Annot. 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1963).
53. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 383-84 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 545 (1961); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935, 961-968 (1966).
54. 354 U.S. 449 (1957); see also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a):
(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest under a warrant
issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or
before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against
the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a
commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
See also LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962
WASH. U.L.Q. 331; Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935, 984-96 (1966).
56. 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
57. Now Chief Justice of the United States.
IMPEACHMENT
Washington University Open Scholarship
452 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
considerations involved in keeping the trial process as an efficient means
of determining the truth along with the need for keeping law enforcement
practices on a level consistent with the standards of our society.58
The court concluded that the balancing of these considerations favored
admissibility in this case-but not without conditions. Neither statement
was per se inculpatory; no act described in the statements constituted
"elements of the case against him"; none of those acts were unlawful;
the testimony was given on direct examination; and the impeaching
statements were significant only on the issue of defendant's credibility. 9
The court held that Walder was controlling and declared that the
distinctions between Tate and Walder clearly supported its decision. The
evidence in Walder "was vastly more damaging than the impeachment
evidence here" and was obtained in violation of a constitutional right,
whereas rule 5(a) "confers no 'rights' in the constitutional sense."60 The
court further suggested that the deterrence theory behind the Mallory
suppression rule makes the accused "an incidental and always
undeserving beneficiary" of the rule."1 By admitting exculpatory
statements made during a period of "unnecessary delay" under 5(a) to
impeach credibility, the court can do its best "to make certain [the
defendant] tells the truth and, as most oaths command, 'the whole
truth'" without sapping the vitality of the deterrence objective of
Mallory.6 2 Analyzing the argument that the admission of these
statements would undesirably influence the defendant's decision whether
to testify, Judge Burger concluded:
What is proscribed by Walder is the freedom to "resort to perjurious
testimony" on the assumption that prior inconsistent statements would be
kept from the jury. Neither sound public policy nor the ends of justice in
the particular case would be served by a different rule. Whatever
inhibition arises out of our view of the law it is not against testifying, but
against testifying falsely.63
The rule admitting exculpatory statements on collateral matters under
the Walder doctrine was thus established.
The Walder-Tate rule was applied in Bailey v. United States, 4
58. 283 F.2d at 379.
59. Id. at 380.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 381.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 382.
64. 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 972 (1964).
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affirming a manslaughter conviction. Judge Wright dissented, pointing
out that the statements "bore on the central issue" of the case and did
not satisfy the "collateral" requirement of Tate. 5 Other cases on this
issue had distinguished Tate on the collateral point.6" Then, in United
States v. Curry,67 statements were admitted to impeach the defendant
although they were obtained in violation of the sixth amendment's right
to counsel and rule 5(a) of the federal rules. The court followed the
Walder doctrine and found the policies supporting exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence not distinguishable on the grounds that one rule was
based on the Constitution and the other on a statute: "Neither Walder
nor any of the cases directly interpreting it indicates that the principle of
limited admissibility for collateral impeachment purposes is inapplicable
when evidence is excluded because unconstitutionally obtained.""5
Shortly after the Curry decision, the Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona established rigid standards for the admissibility of statements
obtained from the defendant during custodial interrogation. One element
of that decision sought to eliminate the common law distinctions
between confessions and admissions and between inculpatory and
exculpatory statements. The language of this paragraph had a
significant impact on the subsequent application of the Walder-Tate-
Curry doctrine:
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our
opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent,
prerequisites io the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.
No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct
confessions and statements which amount to "admissions" of part or all
of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the
individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it
does not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the
same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements
and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made
were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the
prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at a trial or to
65. Id. at 546 n. 3 (Wright, J., dissenting).
66. See Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966); White v. United States, 349 F.2d
965 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
67. 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966). See also Comment, Excluded
Statements Collateral to Issue of Guilt May be Used to Impeach Credibility of Defendant When
They Vary From His Testimony on Direct, 4 Hous. L. REv. 144 (1966).
68. 358 F.2d at 911.
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demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus
to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement. .. .
c. From Miranda to Harris
The first court to decide the impeachment issue after Miranda was the
Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Brewton. 71 Otherwise voluntary
statements were excluded because the Miranda warnings had not been
properly given. The trial court, however, ruled these statements
admissible to impeach the testimony of the accused. The Supreme Court
reversed and found that "any attempt in the future to restrict the
exclusionary rule to the state's case in chief would be inconsistent with
the constitutional principles which are inherent in the Miranda case
.... "71 The court rejected the Tate rule as "virtually unworkable" and
suggested that any alternative finding "could be a major step
backward.1 72 The court considered the need to prevent perjury but found
"the price of such prevention could be to keep defendants off the stand
entirely"; a price too great to pay. 7
3
The majority of states which have decided the issue follow the lead of
Brewton.74 One of the exceptions 75 is State v. Butler,76 in which the court
69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966) (emphasis added). All or part of this
paragraph has been quoted by courts deciding the impeachment question as support for their
decision to exclude the statements. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387, 392 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d
97, 102 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470,476 (3rd Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United
States, 392 F.2d 172, 177 (9th Cir. 1968); Velarde v. People, 466 P.2d 919, 923 (Sup. Ct. Colo.
1970); State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326, 329 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1968); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App.
572, 578, 252 A.2d 487, 491 (1969); People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 323-24, 221 N.E.2d 541, 542,
274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1966) (dissenting opinion); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 91, 171 S.E.2d
398, 404 (1970); State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 60, 248 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1969) (dissenting
opinion). Mr. Justice Brennan reproduced a portion of the paragraph in his dissenting opinion in
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 226, 230 (1971).
70. 247 Ore. 241,422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967). See also Comment, Confession
Taken in Violation of Miranda Rule Held Inadmissible for Impeachment Purposes, 42 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 772 (1967); Comment, Voluntary Confession Elicited Unlawfully Cannot be Used to Impeach
Defendant, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 738 (1967).
71. 247 Ore. at 243,422 P.2d at 582.
72. Id. at 244, 422 P.2d at 583.
73. Id.
74. See People v. Gardner, 266 Cal. App. 2d 19, 71 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1968); Velarde v. People, 466
P.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 1970); State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1968); People v.
Leflar, 38 I11. 2d 216, 230 N.E.2d 827 (1967); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487
(1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912 (1970); People v. Marsh, 14 Mich. App. 518, 165 N.W.2d 853
(1968); People v. Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174 N.W.2d 79 (1969); People v. Schwartz, 30 App.
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held that "voluntary statements of an accused made to police without
cautionary warnings are admissible on the issue of credibility after
defendant had been sworn and testifies in his own defense. ' 7 7 Although
the language of Miranda indicated a contrary finding, it did not decide
that issue.78 The Butler court suggested that the dictum in Miranda
should not be read to undermine the status of Walder.9
The federal courts unanimously followed the Brewton reasoning." In
Div. 2d 385, 292 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1968); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970); State v.
Swanson, 9 Ohio App. 2d 60, 222 N.E.2d 844 (1967); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237
A.2d 209 (1968); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 428 Pa. 458, 239 A.2d 308 (1968); Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150
N.W.2d 370 (1967). Cf. People v. Canard, 257 Cal. App. 2d 444, 65 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 912 (1968); People v. Luna, 37 111. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967); State v.
Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E.2d 638 (1968); State v. Gresham, 10 Ohio App. 2d 199, 227
N.E.2d 248 (1967); Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1969); Carter v. State,
414 S.W. 2d 663 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1967). See also Kent, Miranda v. Arizona-The Use of
Inadmissible Evidence for Impeachment Purposes, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 1177 (1967); Pye, Miranda,
35 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 218-219 (1966); Note, The Collateral Use Doctrine: From Walder to
Miranda, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 912 (1968); Note, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rules, 34 U. CH. L. REV. 939 (1967). But see Cole, Impeaching with Unconstitutionally Obtained
Evidence: Some Reflections on the Palatable Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 18 DEPAUL L. REv. 25
(1968).
75. See also Serrano v. State, 84 Nev. 676, 447 P.2d 497 (1968); State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J.
Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); People v. Quick, 30 App. Div. 2d 561, 291 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1968);
State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); State v. Grant, 459 P.2d 639 (Sup. Ct.
Wash. 1969). Cf. Kiraly v. State, 212 So. 2d 311 (Ct. App. Fla. 1968); State v. Jackson, 201 Kan.
795,443 P.2d 279 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); May v. State, 211 So. 2d 845 (Sup. Ct.
Miss. 1968); Kelly v. King, 196 So. 2d 525 (Sup. Ct. Miss. 1967); State v. Howard, 182 Neb. 411,
155 N.W.2d 339 (1967).
People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, affd, 25 N.Y. 2d 175, 250 N.E. 2d
349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969) relied heavily on People v. Kulis, - App. Div. 2d _ 264
N.Y.S.2d 506 (1965), affd, 18 N.Y.2d 318,221 N.E.2d 541,274 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966). Kulis was a
pre-Miranda case involving statements inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The court held that Escobedo did not affect the Walder
exception. Judge Keating, in his dissenting opinion, argued that Miranda (even though not
applicable to the Kulis case) clearly eliminated the application of the Walder doctrine to Escobedo
violations as well as subsequent Miranda violations. 18 N.Y.S.2d at 323-24, 221 N.E.2d at 542, 274
N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. People v. Harris was a post-Miranda case, but the New York Court of Appeals
concluded, contrary to the rule adopted in the majority of jurisdictions, that Miranda had not
affected the Walder-Kulis rule. See Note, Limited Use of Unlawfully Obtained Statements to
Impeach Defendant's Credibility: The New York Rule in Light of Escobedo and Miranda, 13
N.Y.L. FORUM 146 (1967); Comment, Statements Elicited After Denial of Request for
Counsel-Admissible to Impeach Credibility of Defendant, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 363 (1967).
76. 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969).
77. Id. at 59, 249 N.E.2d at 822.
78. Id. at 58, 249 N.E.2d at 821-22.
79. Id.
80. Blair v. United States, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d
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Groshart v. United States,8' the court analyzed the entire history of the
"admissible to impeach" doctrine and found the cases establishing the
doctrine "undermined by the Supreme Court's Miranda decision.""2
The holding in Groshart was clear: unless the Miranda requirements
were fully satisfied, statements obtained "may not be used against the
defendant at the trial for any purpose whatsoever." '8 3 This was the rule in
the federal courts until Harris v. New York.
IV. HARRIS V. NEW YORK
Viven Harris was arrested January 7, 1966 on two counts of selling
heroin to police undercover agents.84 At the time of his arrest he was
interrogated without adequate warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona.15 The state's case consisted of testimony by the undercover
agent regarding the two alleged transactions, supplemented by the
testimony of another undercover agent and the police chemist. The
district attorney conceded that the defendant's statements were not
admissible as evidence in chief8" and made no effort to use them as such.
Harris took the stand, and certain elements of his testimony were
inconsistent with his statements made during the unlawful
470 (3rd Cir. 1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United
States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967). Cf. United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Prebish, 290 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1968); United States v. Birrell, 276 F. Supp.
798 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); but cf. United States v. Hart, 407 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1969); Dillon v. United
States, 391 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1968).
81. 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968).
82. Id. at 178.
83. Id.
84. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223 (1971). See also Comment, Criminal Law: The
Retreat From Miranda, II S.CL. LAW. 440 (1971).
85. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. 401 U.S. at 223. The fault in the warnings given was the failure to inform the defendant of his
right to appointed counsel before he was questioned:
He was apprised of his privilege to remain silent and that anything he said might be used
against him. He was then questioned, but prior to making any admissions said he would like
to speak to an attorney. The assistant district attorney brought the questioning to a close,
told the defendant he had a right to counsel and asked him if he desired to speak to an
attorney then.
People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (1969). The defendant then
voluntarily answered questions. The court accepted the district attorney's concession that the
statements were obtained in violation of Miranda, but suggested that "under the circumstances
herein, the Miranda warnings given herein might have been found sufficient by the Trial Judge"
after a hearing on that issue. Id. at 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 248 (opinion of Brennan, J.). As a result of
the district attorney's concession, adequacy of the warnings was never an issue on appeal.
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interrogation.17 On cross-examination, over objection by defense
counsel, the state was permitted to introduce those portions of
defendant's interrogation statements inconsistent with his direct
testimony to impeach his credibility. 8 Harris was found guilty on one
count89 and sentenced to six to eight years in prison. The conviction was
87. The gist of the portions [of statements made during custodial interrogation] read in the
presence of the jury is twofold: (1) on January 4, 1966 defendant acted as the undercover
police officer's agent in obtaining narcotics and (2) on January 6, 1966 defendant obtained
narcotics from an unknown person outside a bar and then sold the drugs to the undercover
agent in a bar.
Id. When the defendant took the stand on his own behalf he testified "that he did not give the
undercover agent drugs on January 4, 1966; but on January 6, 1966 he did go to a friend's home
where he put baking powder in two glasine envelopes and sold the latter as heroin to the agent." Id.
88. 401 U.S. at 223. "The court charged the jury that this statement went to the credibility of the
witness and was 'not proof of the defendant's guilt'. Defense counsel in his summation uttered a
similar admonition." 31 App. Div. 2d at 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
89. The jury failed to agree on the other count which was dropped by the state. 31 App. Div. 2d at
828, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247. This failure to agree was an important consideration for the dissenters in
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court:
The trial essentially involved a test of credibility between the undercover agent and
defendant. The jury was unable to agree as to the alleged sale on January 4, although the
undercover agent testified unequivocally that defendant sold him a bag of white powder on
that date and the police chemist testified that the bag contained heroin. Defendant denied this
alleged sale. It seems reasonable to infer from the jury's disagreement on the January 4
charge that they may have had some reservations about the officer's veracity.
Id. at 831, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (Christ, J., dissenting). This fact was emphasized because the
decision in the New York Supreme Court was not based solely on the issue which ultimately reached
the United States Supreme Court, but also on the question of what constitutes "harmless-
constitutional error". Two Judges, Beldock and Munder, held that the admission of the tainted
statements were not error; three Judges, Brennan, Christ and Rabin, agreed that the admission
constituted error of constitutional dimensions, but Judge Brennan was convinced "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the error was harmless. Thus, Judge Brennan wrote the majority opinion
and enunicated the holding of the court but was the only one of the five judges to agree with it.
People v. Harris, 31 App. Div.2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Brennan, J.), id. at 83, 298 N.Y.S.2d at
249 (Beldock, P.J. and Munder, J., concurring), and id. (Christ, J., dissenting joined by Rabin, J.).
The issue of harmless constitutional error was not discussed by the New York Court of Appeals,
People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969) (holding the admission
of statements taken in violation of Miranda warnings for impeachment purposes did not constitute
error); and was criticized in a footnote by Mr. Justice Brennan in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at
229 n.2 (1971). Other cases finding this error to be harmless are: People v. Barry, 237 Cal. App. 2d
154, 46 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967); State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326
(Sup. Ci. Fla. 1968); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); Gaertner v.
State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 380 (1967); but see Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412,
164 S.E.2d 699 (1968). These cases interpret Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also
Note, A Multi-rule Approach to Harmless Constitutional Error, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 202 (1970).
An additional issue before the New York courts in the Harris case concerned the failure of the
prosecution to give notice of intention to "offer a confession or admission in evidence." N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 813-f (Supp. 1970). See notes 126-133 infra and accompanying text.
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upheld by the New York courts, 0 and affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. The Court held that statements by an accused,
inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, may be admitted to
impeach the defendant's testimony if the statements satisfy the legal
standards of trustworthiness."
The Court reasoned that though Miranda gave some indications to the
contrary, the protection which Miranda affords "cannot be perverted
into a license to use perjury by way of a defense ... *"2 Miranda only
barred the prosecution from making its case with in-custody statements
of an accused prior to his waiver of counsel. Although Harris was
impeached by testimony bearing directly on the crimes charged, the
Court found no "difference in principle" that required a result contrary
to Walder v. United States.93
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, 94 disagreed with the
majority's use of Walder and its narrow interpretation of the principles
espoused by Miranda. A belief that the use of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence directly relating to the question of guilt was an
infringement on the defendant's right to choose with an "unfettered
will" whether to take the stand, led Brennan to conclude that the
decision "will seriously undermine" and go "far toward undoing much
of the progress made in conforming police methods to the
Constitution."95
Chief Justice Burger placed great emphasis on the quest for "truth".
While he points out that the defendant made no claim that the
statements were "involuntary", 6 his holding calls for legal standards of
"trustworthiness". 9 7 He also stated:
90. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d
349, 303 N.Y.S. 2d (1969) (per curiam).
91. 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971); Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion with Justices
Harlan, Blackmun, Stewart, and White concurring without separate opinions; Mr. Justice Brennan
wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justices Douglas and Marshall; Mr. Justice Black
dissented without opinion.
92. 401 U.S. at 225. The Court distinguished Miranda with the following statement:
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of
uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary
to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling.
Id. at 224. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
93. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
94. 401 U.S. at 226.
95. Id. at 232. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
96. 401 U.S. at 224.
97. Id.
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Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to
refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right
to commit perjury . . . . Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner
was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the
prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process . . ..
The Chief Justice makes it clear that compliance with Miranda and
"voluntariness" are two distinct things, but no distinction is drawn
between "voluntariness" and "trustworthiness". Because such a
distinction exists,99 one conclusion is that the Harris Court used the
terms interchangeably. This conclusion must be suspect because of its
implications. The due process requirement of "voluntariness" demands
more than that the statements be trustworthy. 100 The question posed is
whether "involuntary" statements which meet the legal standards of
"trustworthiness" may be admitted to impeach under the Harris rule.
Considering the implications of an affirmative answer to this question, it
would seem unlikely, without additional explanation, that the court
intended to alter the meaning or application of these technical terms.
One reasonable interpretation is that the Court meant the "legal
standards of trustworthiness" are manifested in the "voluntariness"
test; however, the case provides no indication that this reading is proper
or improper.
An alternative means of reaching the Harris result would be to reason
that the admission of involuntary statements for any purpose is itself a
direct violation of an accused's right to due process of law while
exclusion under Miranda is merely a remedy for a person whose rights
have already been breached. If the accused testified inconsistently with
his voluntarily given but unconstitutionally obtained statements, that act
would serve as a waiver of the protection Miranda provides. This
reasoning process requires that the Miranda exclusionary rule be
premised on an objective other than deterrence. Deterrence is a pre-
breach remedy rather than a post-breach remedy. There is evidence that
the Chief Justice used this latter approach in reaching the decision:
The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the
jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process
98. Id. at 225. The emphasis here on reliability would appear to be quite different than its
treatment in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) and Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219 (1968); see note III infra.
99. See notes 25-36 supra and accompanying text.
100. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
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should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that
impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that
the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct,
sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.'
It is indeed difficult to argue that this approach is consistent with the
precise holding in Miranda.0 2 The Court in Harris has, in effect,
distinguished "'voluntary' unconstitutional confessions . . . from
'involuntary' unconstitutional confessions, solely for the purposes of
impeachment . . . ."10 3-a distinction which the lower courts
consistently rejected.'
Harris does not appear to place any limitations on the use of tainted
evidence to impeach, as did its predecessors, Walder, Tate and Curry.
Chief Justice Burger does not acknowledge his own prior opinions on the
issue, and fails to spell out any of the limitations or potential
ramifications he so carefully delineated in Tate and Lockley v. United
States.0 5 A4gnello appears to be in direct conflict with the Harris result,
but Agnello was not mentioned in either the majority or the dissenting
opinions, although both quoted extensively from Walder.10 The dissent
101. 401 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
102. "IT]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444.
103. State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241,242, 422 P.2d 581, 582 (1957).
104. See note 74 supra.
105. 270 F.2d 915, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The court admitted a full confession on cross-
examination to impeach the defendant's direct testimony. The defendant contended that the
confession was obtained in violation of Rule 5(a), FED. R. CRIM. P., and should be inadmissible for
all purposes. On appeal, the court found no 5(a) violation and affirmed the conviction without
discussion of the Walder rule. Id. at 917-918. Judge Burger disagreed with the majority's decision
and went on to consider the Walder problem. "A confession inadmissible under Rule 5(a) should be
received for impeachment only under the most guarded conditions." Id. at 919 (emphasis added).
He suggested an extension of the Walder doctrine in the following manner:
From the Walder case I would conclude that before inadmissible evidence can be used for
impeachment, three factors must be present: (1) the defendant must elect to take the stand,
(2) his testimony which conflicts with the inadmissible statements must do more than merely
deny the elements of the crime for which he is being tried, and (3) the inadmissible statements
should be received only to the extent that they do not admit the very acts which are essential
elements of the crime charged.
Id. at 919. These standards, plus the requirement that the inadmissible statements not be per se
inculpatory, became the law in Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See notes 56-
63 supra and accompanying text.
106. Walder considered both sides of the issue and the Court's language, taken out of context,
could be used to support either side of the issue. Compare that portion of Walder quoted by the
Harris majority:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/4
Vol. 1971:441]
argues that Walder was inapposite to the Harris result because of the
"collateral" requirement and placed great emphasis on the policies
espoused by the Court's decisions of the prior decade. 1 7 An accused
must be free to choose with an "unfettered" will whether to exercise his
constitutional privilege to either testify or not testify and the majority,
says the dissent, denies him that freedom of choice."0 8 The only objective
of exclusion discussed by the majority is "deterrence", although other
objectives have played a significant role in the development of the
doctrine. The Court's failure to discuss these interrelated issues in Harris
makes any evaluation of its impact speculative.
V. THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS
a. The Forced Choice Between Two Valuable Rights
The privilege against self-incrimination gives a defendant the right to
choose whether or not to testify. That choice must result from the
"unfettered exercise of his own will." ' 9 The same privilege also
prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of that right as a
means of convicting an accused. As a result of Harris, a confession
which does not meet this constitutional standard may be used against
him if he takes the stand. The defendant who takes the stand has an
obligation to tell the truth, but he also has the right "to deny all the
elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the
Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by
it, and therefore not available for its case in chief."" 0 Harris places a
unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method
by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the
Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.
[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious
testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility.
401 U.S. 224, quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 62, 65; with the paragraph quoted by
Mr. Justice Brennan:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the
accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief.
401 U.S. at 228, quoting 347 U.S. at 65.
107. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
108. 401 U.S. at 230.
109. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
110. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). See also note 106 supra.
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burden on the defendant's ability to freely exercise his fifth amendment
rights. Such a burden, which "chills" the unfettered exercise of
constitutional rights, has not been tolerated by the Court in other
contexts."'
Faced with the identical problem, the Oregon Supreme Court
measured the value of defendant's testimony to the adversary process
against the danger of losing that testimony because of the fear that
illegally obtained statements would be used to impeach him: "If the
choice is to exclude all illegally obtained evidence or to silence the
defendant as a witness, it is better to exclude the illegal evidence.""' The
problem created by the forced choice between valuable constitutional
rights was not discussed or evaluated in Harris.
b. Prejudice
Confessions have been assailed as the "weakest and most suspicious
of all evidence" and great caution has been urged in considering their
use."13 CoAfessions secured in a manner assuring their trustworthiness
have also been acclaimed as "the highest kind of evidence.""' A
confession which meets the standards of voluntariness but fails to satisfy
Ill. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), defendant's testimony at an
unsuccessful pre-trial hearing to suppress certain evidence was used against him at the trial. In order
to establish standing to suppress, defendant had to claim ownership of the object sought to be
suppressed and was therefore confronted with a dilemma: "[A] defendant who wishes to establish
standing must do so at the risk that the words which he utters may later be used to incriminate
him." Id. at 393. The Court said: "In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. We therefore hold that
when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt
unless he makes no objection." Id. at 394.
Three weeks later the Court struck down a death penalty provision in a federal statute because it
imposed the same kind of impermissible choice. In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), a
statute authorizing a jury-and only a jury-to impose the death penalty created an impermissible
choice between the defendant's free exercise of his sixth amendment right to a jury trial and his fifth
amendment right not to plead guilty. Id. at 581.
These two cases established that a forced choice between the free exercise of two valuable
constitutional rights would not be tolerated. Cf. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968).
But see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), which held that a plea of guilty would not be
deemed involuntary because the defendant was faced with the same kind of impermissible choice
present in Jackson. The effect of Brady, McMann and Parker on the impermissible choice presented
in Harris is unclear, but it would appear that Simmons is more directly in point. But see note 124
infra.
112. State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241,244, 422 P.2d 581, 583 (1967).
113. 3 WIGMORE § 820b at 302.
114. Id.
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the teachings of Miranda falls between these two extremes. Statements
by an individual which implicate him with criminal acts are the most
devastating evidence against him when he seeks exoneration. The only
available safeguard is an instruction to the jury to limit its consideration
of this evidence to the credibility of the accused and not to consider it as
substantive evidence."' "Such an instruction, as seems to be generally
agreed, is a mere verbal ritual."116 Chief Justice Burger was among the
first to make this point in connection with the impeachment issue, when,
as Circuit Judge dissenting in Lockley v. United States, he said:
...The charge given in this case was explicitly framed and, if it were
possible to narrow the thrust and impact of the full confession in these
circumstances, the trial judge did all in his power to accomplish that
result. But once introduced for this "limited" purpose, the most skillful
charge ever framed is hard put to accomplish the prophylactic properties
essential to a fair result. 1 7
In Lockley he was willing to admit specific portions of an illegally
obtained confession to impeach the defendant, but only after those
statements were judicially scrutinized under rigid specifications.118 Those
specifications were ignored in Harris and no allusion was made to the
potential impact on a judge's ability "to accomplish the prophylactic
properties essential to a fair result." It is the extreme concern for the
rights of the individual that stands as a hallmark of our system of justice.
The Constitution is not so limited as to merely prohibit compelling a
man to testify against himself or face imprisonment, but "demands that
the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." 9 A trial judge,
attempting to administer a fair trial, may wish to consider this before
invoking the rule of Harris.12 0
c. Harris and The Federal Rules
The Court in Harris also omitted any discussion of its procedural
115. MCCORMICK § 39 at 77; see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
116. 1d.
117. 270 F.2d 915, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion). "The prejudicial impact of the full
confession on the jury cannot be eliminated by instruction from the bench, no matter how carefully,
pointedly or precisely phrased." Id.at 920.
118. Id. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
120. The degree of prejudice inherent in using unlawfully procured statements to impeach the
accused is probably greater than admitting his prior felony convictions, but some of the
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implications. The admissibility of challenged confessions is determined
at a pre-trial hearing.12' No pre-trial hearing was conducted in Harris'
case because the prosecution conceded the statements to be inadmissible
under Miranda. The Supreme Court thus approved the use of these
statements to impeach the defendant without an independent hearing.'2
Harris made no claim that the statements were either coerced or
involuntary, and this fact may serve to explain why the decision was
limited to the Miranda requirements.
This precise issue was presented in State v. Catrett'2' and the court
held that otherwise inadmissible statements must be subjected to an
independent hearing before they can be admitted for any purpose. That
decision, however, was premised on the pre-Harris rule that statements
obtained unlawfully could not be admitted to impeach.2 4 Harris does
not appear to abrogate the rule that "involuntary" confessions are
inadmissible to impeach, and the Miranda requirements are an element
considerations are analogous. See, e.g., Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Weaver v. United States, 408 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969). See also
McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 L. & Soc, ORDER 1;
Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, I LOYOLA U.L. J. 247 (1970).
121. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (a) (1969); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12; 3 WIGIORE § 861; Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935,
1058-72 (1966).
122. See note 86 supra.
123. 276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970).
124. See note 74 supra. See also Gladden v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1968); Breedlove v.
Beto, 404 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1968); Velarde v. People, 466 P.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 1970); People
v. Lefler, 38 II1. 2d 216, 230 N.E.2d 827 (1967); but see People v. Quick, 30 App. Div. 2d 561, 291
N.Y.S.2d 132 (1968).
In Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.C.D.C. 1964), a new trial was granted because the
judge refused to make an advisory decision about whether certain inadmissible statements obtained
from the accused might be admitted to impeach the accused if he took the stand. At the end of the
government's case, certain statements obtained from the defendant were ruled inadmissible by the
court and the government rested. The only defense planned was the testimony of the defendant. The
defendant's appointed counsel, uncertain as to whether these statements might be admissible under
the Walder-Tate rule, sought an advisory ruling by the court. When the judge refused, counsel
convinced the defendant not to take the stand and the defense rested. The defendant was found
guilty. The motion to set aside the verdict was granted by Judge J. Skelly Wright because "[tlhe
failure to inform petitioner of the applicable law deprived him of a fair trial." Id. at 178. The
decision was affirmed on appeal, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965), but only on the grounds that the
decision of Judge Wright was reasonable and within his discretionary power.
In United States v. Hart, 407 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1969), involving a Simmons situation prior to
the Simmons decision, the court ruled that the refusal by the trial judge to make an anticipatory
ruling on the admissibility of unlawfully obtained statements to impeach the defendant was not
error and was within the judge's discretion. The case can be distinguished from Poe in that no
indication was made in Hart that the defendant would have taken the stand had the anticipatory
ruling been in the defendant's favor. This case indicates that before a ruling on "admissibility to
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of "voluntariness"; t2 therefore, it seems unlikely that the concession of
"voluntariness" made by the defendant in Harris will be forthcoming as
a tactical matter in future cases. Without such a concession, a hearing
would appear to be necessary to establish the "voluntariness" or
"trustworthiness" of the statements.
Another procedural problem created by Harris relates to the discovery
provisions of the current Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12 6 and the
proposed amendments. 12 7 The current rules permit the judge, in his
discretion, to order the prosecution to disclose "written or recorded
statements made by the defendant" which should be known to the
government. 2  The proposed amendments make such disclosure
mandatory and include the disclosure of "the substance of any oral
statement which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial
made by the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to
interrogation by any person known to the defendant to be a government
agent."'2  This language is similar to the New York rule'3 which was an
issue in the Harris case at the state appellate level.' 3' The appellate court
found the statute to require disclosure only when the prosecution
intended to introduce the evidence in its case in chief; since the evidence
was admitted to impeach, there was no breach of the disclosure
requirement. Testimony inconsistent with unlawfully obtained prior
statements was a contingency the state could not anticipate so as to
establish "intention" within the meaning of the rule. 32 This result would
be different under the proposed rules if written or recorded statements
were involved. However, if "intent" is similarly defined, the result would
be the same under the proposed rules regarding oral statements. The
slight difference in incriminating quality between oral and written
impeach" will be made, the defendant must take the stand; wait and see if the government attempts
to introduce the statements; and then suffer the consequences of an independent hearing at that
point. The result of Harris and Hart may be that two separate hearings on the admissibility of the
same evidence must be held employing different standards for each hearing. See notes 141-43 infra
and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1965); notes 30-36 supra and
accompanying text.
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
127. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553 (1970).
128. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(i)(I).
129. 48 F.R.D. at 588.
130. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-f (Supp. 1970).
131. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d
349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969).
132. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245,247 (1969).
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statements would hardly seem to justify the procedural distinction.
Providing an adequate defense for an accused who "can't remember"
what he said to police would be less burdensome if the contents of these
statements were known. This information would assist counsel in
making an intelligent decision about how to plead and whether to have
defendant testify on his own behalf. Disclosure of unlawfully obtained
statements, not intended by the prosecution for its case in chief but now
available for impeachment, would serve to further the objectives of Rule
16.133
V. CONCLUSION
If the Court had reached the opposite conclusion in Harris the result
would simply have been consistent with the decisions of the last
decade. 3 1 Some analysis of the related issues might have provided
guidelines and insight into the Court's thinking on these constitutional
problems.'3 However, Harris did neither of these and the actual result
makes evaluation of its significance speculative.
133. The objective stated by the advisory committee is "that broad discovery contributes to the
fair and efficient administration of criminal justice by providing the defendant with enough
information to make an informed decision as to plea; by minimizing the undesirable effect of
surprise at the trial; and by otherwise contributing to an accurate determination of the issue of guilt
or innocence." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedurefor the
United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 597 (1970). Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
A possible means available to the defense counsel for circumventing this limitation would be to
disclose to the government a present intention to have the defendant testify, the nature and substance
of his anticipated testimony, and a specific request to the effect that "if, given these events, you
intend to offer the oral statements for impeachment purposes, we request full disclosure of such
statements in accord with Rule 16." If the government responds by producing the statements, then
(1) a more intelligent decision can be made as to whether defendant should take the stand, (2)
defendant's direct testimony could be tailored to avoid inconsistency with the prior oral statements,
or (3) counsel could have the defendant impeach himself by disclosing the prior statements, thus
eliminating the need for the prosecution to introduce them and diminish the prejudicial impact of
impeachment on cross-examination. If the government responds by claiming an inability to
formulate "intent" on such conditional circumstances and any decision regarding rebuttal
necessarily depends on what the defense actually does on direct, then at the very least, the potential
argument for waiver presents an interesting legal question for appellate review. The best result
would seem to be to alter the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules to give oral statements the
same status as written or recorded statements.
134. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961).
135. The value of such comment might be questioned given Harris' treatment ofsimilarly helpful
comments in Miranda. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/4
Vol. 1971:441]
Chief Justice Burger observed that Harris would be of little interest
"except to members of the bar."' 36 This comment is difficult to
comprehend considering Harris' treatment of Miranda v. Arizona. The
innocent as well as the guilty are exposed to the rigors of police
interrogation. Statements obtained in that "inherently compelling
atmosphere", 3 7 once thought to be completely protected, may now be
admitted to impeach. The significance of this result, compounded by the
inadequacy of the Court's analysis, cannot be underplayed.
Whatever Harris' significance, it does not overrule Miranda.
Adequate warnings and effective waiver must be proved before
statements can be admitted in the prosecutor's case in chief. Tainted
statements may be used to impeach only if they are voluntary. Judges
who wish to insure the constitutional rights of the accused and those who
do not want to risk being overruled, may find the impeachment
distinction unworkable. The Supreme Court has subjected confessions to
rigid standards of appellate review when the defendant's statements are
admitted into evidence. 3 Review is nonexistent when such statements
are excluded.'
Harris did not overrule the state court decisions establishing a
contrary rule insofar as those decisions were based on state
constitutional provisions or case law development. "' The states remain
free to choose their own rule. The federal rule was altered by Harris, but
an evaluation of its practical application involves a consideration of 18
U.S.C. § 3501. It provides that "the presence or absence of any of the
above mentioned factors [141] to be taken into consideration by the judge
need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession."142
A judge, without examining the constitutional problems of that
provision, could find inadequate Miranda warnings sufficient to support
exclusion on "voluntariness" grounds. 43 Review of a trial judge's
136. Millstone, Supreme Court Moving to the Right, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 28, 1971,
§ F, at I, col. 2. The Chief Justice took the unusual step of not announcing the Harris decision from
the Bench.
137. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448,456-61,465-68, 476-78,496 (1966).
138. 8 WIGMORE § 862.
139. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937).
140. See notes 70-77 supra and accompanying text.
141. These factors are quoted in note 19 supra. Included are the Miranda warnings.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (b) (1969) (emphasis added).
143. This result would not be inconsistent with the pre-Miranda voluntariness test
notwithstanding 18 U.S.C. § 3501. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) and notes 30-
36 supra and accompanying text.
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finding that a confession was involuntary would be extremely unusual in
contrast to the rigid standards invoked when the finding is voluntary.
Judges inclined to follow the Miranda policies could utilize this
approach to circumvent Harris on the impeachment question.
The fear expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan, that Harris "goes far
toward undoing much of the progress made in conforming police
methods to the Constitution,"'4 is entitled to attention. The same fine
line distinction which may be unworkable could be a means to
circumvent Miranda. If statements inadequate only under Miranda are
generally held to be voluntary for impeachment purposes, then it is
difficult to foresee how Miranda would not become merely a "form of
words". 
144. 401 U.S. at 232.
145. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1921), Mr. Justice Holmes
stated that the exclusionary rule of Weeks was necessary to prevent the fourth amendment from
becoming merely a "form of words". Former Chief Justice Warren, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966), applied these same words to the fifth amendment. Their use in this note is in
reference to the language of the uncounted Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution to
mandate exclusion.
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